This publish was authored by Michael Eisenberg, Touro Regulation Heart
The defendant owned 4 heaps containing private belongings together with scrap steel and automotive elements for private use. These things had been saved open air and in sheds in a dilapidated situation. The defendant had neither obtained a license to function a junk yard nor a particular exception from the city. The city sought injunctive reduction to cease the defendant from working a junk yard and the additional imposition of civil penalties and the award of prices and legal professional’s charges. The trial court docket discovered that the defendant was certainly working or sustaining a junk yard in violation of RSA 236:114 and that his properties had been a nuisance. The defendant was ordered to abate the nuisance. The court docket approved the city to impose a civil penalty of $50 for every single day the defendant remained out of compliance previous a decided date. Nonetheless, the trial court docket disregarded the city’s petition to implement the native zoning ordinance, reasoning that the defendant should promote junk to be able to qualify as “working” a junk yard below the zoning ordinance and that the supplies had been solely for the defendant’s private use.
The trial court docket’s statutory and zoning ordinance interpretation had been every reviewed de novo. The defendant argued on attraction that the trial court docket was convicted as a matter of regulation when making use of RSA 236:111-:129 to the defendant’s 4 non-business private properties and indiscriminately constituting every as a junk yard however placement of things on every property. The court docket upheld the trial’s court docket discovering based mostly on ample proof within the file as to the distribution of junk on the respective properties. So too, below RSA 236:112, a junk yard needn’t be a administrative center per se, however could also be any “place” used to retailer junk. The defendant additionally argued that the topic parcels of land are inside New Hampshire’s restricted entry freeway system for I-93, and thus, RSA 236:90-:110 can be the “appropriate” statutory subdivision to use. Nonetheless, the court docket affirmed that the provisions of RSA 236:111-:129 apply to all junk yards, together with these topic to regulation below RSA 236:90-110. The court docket upheld the trial court docket’s discovering that the zoning ordinance regulates “junk yards” as an “industrial use.” The storage of 1’s personal private belongings on one’s personal property is just not an “industrial use.”
Lincoln v Chenard, 2022 WL 166066 (NH 1/19/2022)